A recent issue of The Economist contained a deep irony. 

The newspaper’s “Finance & Economics” section featured an article on the US economy. After expressing happy surprise that the US economy continues to grow despite headwinds, the article expressed two worries: first, that this growth would fuel further inflation (with no mention of the Fed’s monetizing the full $4.2 trillion of bipartisan COVID deficit-spending spree, as The Economist continues to blame supply chains and pent-up demand), and second, that Treasury rates (now at a 16-year high) will place pressure on the economy.

On the very next page, the section turns to the latest Argentine crisis. Twenty years ago, Argentina had tackled the peso crisis of 2001, the hyperinflation of the late 1980s, and the frequent military coups that persisted into the early 1980s. One commentator glibly predicted in 2006 that the Argentine people would never again tolerate inflation above ten percent. That problem was solved for several years by federal interference in the Central Bank, and a delicious but inaccurate asado of fake statistics – to the point that The Economist simply stopped reporting unreliable numbers coming from Argentina’s statistics office. Argentine inflation now stands at 138 percent (according to the latest official report). In a technicality that goes beyond the scope of this short piece, Argentina is now pushing the International Monetary Fund’s lending model to a breaking point. After two decades of bailouts and borrowing, Argentina may yet again default. 

Without irony, and without any indication of a parallel to the US situation, The Economist reports that Argentina’s “policymakers are torn between printing pesos to cover the government’s bills and the need to avoid hyperinflation.”